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Public infrastructures, public consumption and welfare 
in a new open economy macro model 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 8/2009 
Giovanni Ganelli – Juha Tervala 
Monetary Policy and Research Department 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on the trade-off faced by governments in deciding the 
allocation of public expenditures between productivity-enhancing public 
infrastructures and utility-enhancing public consumption in a two-country model. 
The results show that a permanent increase in the domestic stock of public capital 
financed by a reduction in public consumption raises domestic welfare if the 
productivity of public capital is high and the weight of public consumption in 
private utility is low compared with private consumption. The effect on foreign 
welfare is negative in the short run, but positive in the long run. This implies that, 
if foreign authorities care not only about the present discounted value of welfare 
but also about welfare dynamics, a permanent domestic reallocation of public 
spending might result in a virtuous global technological cycle. 
 
Keywords: public spending composition, welfare, imperfect competition, nominal 
rigidities 
 
JEL classification numbers: E62, F41, H42, H54 
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Julkinen infrastruktuuri, julkinen kulutus ja 
hyvinvointi avotalouden makromallissa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 8/2009 
Giovanni Ganelli – Juha Tervala 
Rahapolitiikka- ja tutkimusosasto 
 
 
Tiivistelmä 
Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan kahden maan mallia käyttäen, miten valtioiden 
tulisi allokoida julkiset menot julkisen infrastruktuurin ja hyötyä tuottavien julkis-
ten kulutusmenojen kesken. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että pysyvä, julkisten 
kulutusmenojen vähentämisellä rahoitettava lisäys julkisessa infrastruktuurissa voi 
lisätä hyvinvointia. Hyvinvointi lisääntyy, jos julkisen infrastruktuurin tuottavuus 
on suuri ja julkisen kulutuksen hyöty on pieni suhteessa yksityiseen kulutukseen. 
Kotimaan julkisten menojen rakenteen muutoksen vaikutus ulkomaan hyvin-
vointiin on negatiivinen lyhyellä ajalla, mutta positiivinen pitkällä ajalla. Tämä 
merkitsee, että jos ulkomaa ei välitä ainoastaan hyvinvoinnin diskontatusta nyky-
arvosta, vaan myös hyvinvoinnin sopeutumisesta, pysyvä muutos kotimaan julkis-
ten menojen rakenteessa voi aiheuttaa positiivisen teknologisen kierteen. 
 
Avainsanat: julkisten menojen rakenne, hyvinvointi, epätäydellinen kilpailu, 
nimellisjäykkyydet 
 
JEL-luokittelu: E62, F41, H42, H54 
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7 
1 Introduction 
Governments face several trade-offs in the process of planning and executing 
fiscal policy. For example, a decision on the appropriate fiscal stance needs to 
take in to account both the short-run impact on the economy and the long-run 
sustainability of public finances. Furthermore, decisions on the methods of 
financing the deficit (or on the use of the surplus) and on the composition of 
public expenditures also need to be made. 
 With regard to the latter issue, governments are involved in the provision of 
public infrastructures which can increase the productivity of private firms.1 
Examples include roads, bridges, airports, and all ‘… those public works, which, 
though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, 
however, of such a nature that the profit could never repay the expense to any 
individual or small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be 
expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or 
maintain.’ (Adam Smith 1776). At the same time, governments spend large part 
of their budgets on goods and services that can also be privately provided and, 
while they do not directly impact the productivity of the private sector, are likely 
to affect consumers’ utility in a way similar to private consumption. Examples of 
such utility-enhancing spending for public consumption include (but are 
obviously not limited to) insurance programs, defense, clean streets, and public 
parks. 
 This trade-off between productivity-enhancing public investment and utility-
enhancing public consumption is often at the forefront of the public debate and 
policy discussions. Despite being a major policy issue, this trade-off has however 
received less attention than it deserves in the academic literature. 
 Several authors, particularly since the work of Aschauer (1989) have 
investigated, both theoretically and empirically, the consequences of productive 
public spending. This literature includes Baxter and King (1993), Gramlich 
(1994), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), Rioja (1999, 2003), Feltenstein and 
Morris (1990), Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004), Coto-Martinez (2006), Duggal, 
Saltzman and Klein (2007) and Linnemann and Schabert (2006). Very few papers 
in this literature, however, explicitly focus on the trade-off between productive 
infrastructure spending and the welfare effects of public consumption. Prominent 
exceptions are Barro (1990), who incorporates tax-financed government services 
that affect production and utility into an endogenous growth model, and 
Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), who carry out a similar analysis using a 
neoclassical intertemporal framework. 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we will use interchangeably the expressions infrastructure expenditure and 
capital expenditure. Public infrastructures and public capital will also be used as synonymous. 
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 In this paper we analyze the trade-off related to government spending 
composition in the context of a New Keynesian two-country model with imperfect 
competition and nominal rigidities. Our model belongs to the so-called New Open 
Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) framework, which many currently regard as 
the workhorse model for the analysis of macroeconomic issues in open 
economies.2 Compared to the existing literature, one key innovation of our paper 
is that of analyzing productive public infrastructure spending in this new 
modeling paradigm. While some of the papers that we reviewed contain 
ingredients of the New Keynesian open economy paradigm, we are not aware of 
any paper that analyses the implications of public capital in a model that features 
at the same time imperfect competition, nominal rigidities and a two-country 
world. 
 As we already stressed above, the only papers of which we are aware that 
explicitly focus on the trade-off between productive government spending and 
utility from public consumption (Barro 1990; Turnovsky and Fisher 1995) do not 
belong to the New Keynesian strand of literature and do not consider market 
imperfections such as monopolistic competition and price rigidities. The analysis 
of how the trade-off is affected by such imperfections is a novel contribution of 
our paper. In particular, in Section 4 we compare our welfare results to those of 
the previous literature. We find that, contrary to Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), 
since initial output and consumption are sub-optimally low in our model (due to 
monopolistic competition) a shift toward productive government spending is 
welfare improving even in the short run for plausible parameter values. In 
addition, the open economy dimension is also important in differentiating our 
welfare results from those derived by Turnovsky and Fisher (1995). In our open 
economy framework, unlike in Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), domestic residents 
can also increase short-run consumption, and therefore welfare, by running a 
current account deficit. 
 The above discussion implies that our welfare results are more in line with the 
endogenous growth model presented by Barro (1990) – in which an increase in 
the share of productive capital in total government spending is welfare-enhancing 
at all horizons – than with the neoclassical framework used by Turnovsky and 
Fisher (1995). 
 The open-economy dimension also allows us – unlike Barro (1990) and 
Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) – to study the impact of a shift in domestic 
government spending composition on the current account, the exchange rate, and 
                                                 
2 The NOEM literature originated with the seminal paper of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996). 
Subsequent important contributions include, but are not limited to, Betts and Devereux (2000, 
2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Devereux and Engel (2002), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 
2002), Hau (2000), Tille (2001), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Bergin (2003), Kollman (2002), 
Sutherland (1996, 2005), Pierdzioch (2004), and Ghironi (2006). Surveys of this literature are 
provided by Lane (2001), Sarno (2001), and Corsetti (2007). Coutinho (2005) focuses on the fiscal 
NOEM literature. 
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on foreign variables. This analysis of how public infrastructures in one country 
affect another country is important from both the theoretical and empirical point 
of view. Clarida and Findlay (1994), for example, in a theoretical study of 
European integration, stress how countries engage in strategic behavior by taking 
into account, in their decision on public infrastructure investment, the level of 
public capital in neighboring countries. Empirically, important spillover effects 
are found to be generated by public highway spending between USA states 
(Pereira and Andraz, 2004) and by total public capital spending between the USA 
and Canada (Owyong and Thangavelu, 2001). 
 More in general, we see our paper as furthering the theoretical analysis of 
fiscal policy. This is important because while policy makers in several countries 
are showing a renewed interest in the fiscal instrument and an increasing number 
of academic and policy studies are focusing on fiscal issues, the analysis of the 
macroeconomic and welfare impact of fiscal policy still receives limited attention 
compared with that of monetary policy. In addition, as stressed by Alesina and 
Perotti (1995), the academic debate on fiscal policy tends to neglect composition 
issues. Fiscal policy is therefore usually modeled with reference to a general 
aggregate, often identified exclusively in terms of government consumption of 
goods and services.3 This implies that additional work taking into account the 
complexity of fiscal policy and the multi-dimensionality of governments’ fiscal 
activities can be particularly useful. The spirit of this paper is that of contributing 
to foster the debate in this area. 
 Our analysis shows that a permanent increase in domestic public 
infrastructure financed by a reduction in public consumption is welfare enhancing 
for domestic residents, provided that the productivity of public capital is not too 
low and the weight of public consumption (compared to private consumption) in 
private utility not too high. However, since a negative net welfare impact cannot 
be ruled out, one policy implication is that governments should take into account 
household preferences with respect to public provision of goods and services in 
deciding the composition of public spending. 
 The implementation of such a policy, moreover, has important international 
implications. In particular, the impact on foreign utility is negative in the short 
run, because foreign residents have to meet an increased global demand within a 
relatively underdeveloped (compared to domestic) public infrastructure system, 
while they only reap the benefits of the increased global demand in the long run. 
Foreign long-run welfare gains, however, more than offset the short-term losses. 
One implication of this analysis is that, if foreign authorities care not only about 
the present discounted value of foreign utility, but also about welfare dynamics, 
the domestic policy change can generate incentives for reallocation of public 
                                                 
3 Noteworthy exceptions, besides the papers already mentioned above, are Roche (1996), Finn 
(1998), Lane and Perotti (2003), and van der Ploeg (2006). 
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spending abroad. In this case, as the foreign country tries to avoid short-run 
welfare losses, it has an incentive to also increase the level of its productive public 
capital. A domestic policy shift can therefore result in a virtuous global 
technological cycle. 
 If the domestic shift in public spending composition is temporary, overall 
domestic welfare is reduced for low levels of the productivity of public capital, 
but is increased for high levels. This implies that governments which value the 
welfare of their citizens should carefully evaluate the impact of planned 
infrastructure projects on the productivity of the private sector before changing 
the public spending mix, especially in cases in which the projected increase in 
productive capital stock is likely to be temporary (due, for example, to uncertainty 
about securing the necessary fiscal resources to maintain it in the medium and 
long run). 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. 
Section 3 discusses the parameterization. Sections 4 and 5 present and discuss the 
results for the case of a permanent and of a temporary shift in public spending 
composition, respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 The model 
The model is a standard NOEM model, similar to those developed by Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1995) and Betts and Devereux (2000). Our main modelling 
innovations, which are crucial for the issues we want to investigate, are the 
introduction of productive public capital and of utility-enhancing public 
consumption. We also assume that nominal rigidities take the form of staggered 
price setting as in Calvo (1983), rather than one-period fixed prices.4 
 The model contains two countries. Firms and households are indexed by 
z ∈ [0,1]. A fraction n of households and firms are located in the domestic 
country, while n1−  are located in the foreign country. In the description of the 
model that follows, unless equations for the foreign country are explicitly 
discussed they can be assumed to be symmetric to the equations for the domestic 
country. 
 
 
                                                 
4 We restrict our attention to the case of Producer Currency Pricing (PCP), in order to focus on the 
international impact of government spending composition, rather than on deviations from the 
Purchasing Power Parity. 
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2.1 Households 
Domestic households gain utility from private and public consumption and real 
balances. They also experience disutility from supplying labor. The domestic 
utility function is therefore given by 
 
∑∞
=
ε−− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ φ+−
ε−
χ
+β=
ts
C
s
2
s1
s
s
s
ts
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)z(l)
P
M(
1
ClogU  (2.1) 
 
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, C is a composite good representing private 
consumption and Ps is the price index associated with it. CsG  represents public 
consumption. Ms denotes nominal money balances and ls(z) the household’s 
supply of labor; ε > 0 is the inverse of the consumption elasticity of money 
demand, and χ and φ are positive parameters. 
 The composite private consumption good is defined in the following equation 
as an aggregate across the individual goods produced by firms 
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0
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where θ is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of individual goods. The 
associated price index is 
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where pt(z) is the price of good z expressed in domestic currency, )z(p*t  is the 
foreign currency price of foreign good z and E is the exchange rate, defined as the 
price of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency. 
 The budget constraint of the domestic representative household is given by 
 
ttttttt1t1tttt PCP)z(lwMDDM τ−π+−++=δ+ −−  (2.4) 
 
where D denotes the household’s holding of domestic currency denominated 
nominal bonds, which account for international shifts in wealth, δ is the price of a 
bond (the inverse of one plus the nominal interest rate), wt is the nominal wage 
paid to the household in a competitive labor market, π is the household’s share of 
profits received by firms and τ denotes real lump-sum taxes paid to the 
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government. Given that bonds are denominated in domestic currency, the budget 
constraint of the foreign representative household is 
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where foreign variables are denoted by asterisks. 
 The first order conditions are given by 
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Equations (2.6) and (2.7) are the Euler equations for optimal domestic and foreign 
consumption, respectively. Equations (2.8) and (2.9) are the domestic and foreign 
optimal labor supply equations, which equate the disutility of supplying an extra 
unit of labor with the marginal utility of the extra private consumption that can be 
bought due to the marginal increase in labor supply. Finally, equations (2.10) and 
(2.11) show that households’ optimal money demand is an increasing function of 
private consumption and a decreasing function of the interest rate. 
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2.2 The government 
The consolidated budget constraint of the monetary and fiscal authorities, 
expressed in per-capita terms, is given by 
 
t
1tt
tt P
MMG −−+τ=  (2.12) 
 
where total government spending Gt is distributed between public consumption 
C
tG  and public capital 
I
tG , according to the formula 
I
t
C
tt GGG += . In the 
experiments that we carry out in this paper, only the composition of (domestic) 
government spending changes. Total government spending, taxes and the money 
supply (as well as foreign composition of government spending) are kept constant 
throughout our exercises. 
 Government consumption takes the same form as the private sector’s 
consumption index and it is thus given by 
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An analogous index governs public capital spending. Government spending on 
public capital and consumption are assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive 
process described by the following equations 
 
I
t
I
t
I
t 1GˆGˆ σ+ρ= −  (2.14) 
 
C
t
C
t
C
t 1GˆGˆ σ+ρ= −  (2.15) 
 
where ρ governs the persistence of a fiscal shock, σI and σC are unpredictable 
shifts in the components of government spending and the hat notation represents 
percentage deviations from the initial steady state. 
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2.3 Private firms 
Technology 
 
Each firm produces a differentiated good. The production function of a 
representative domestic firm z is 
 
α
= )K)(z(l)z(y Gttt  (2.16) 
 
where yt(z) is the output of firm z, lt(z) is the labor input used by firm z, α > 0 
measures the productivity of public capital and KG is the stock of public capital 
provided by government spending, which evolves according to 
 
I
t
G
t
G
1t GK)1(K +λ−=+  (2.17) 
 
where λ is the depreciation rate. 
 One obvious shortcoming of our model is the absence of private capital. This 
is a limitation shared with large part of the NOEM literature, which usually 
assumes that labor is the only factor of production. The papers – discussed in the 
Introduction – which focus on the impact of productive public spending in a 
closed economy usually assume that private capital also enters the production 
function. Since our framework complicates the modeling strategy by introducing 
the open economy dimension, we abstract from private capital so as to avoid 
overly complicating the model. 
 If public and private capital are complements in production – as it is likely to 
be the case for most categories of productive public investment (for example, 
roads and airports) – increasing the stock of public capital would also increase the 
marginal productivity of private capital. In this case the introduction of private 
capital in our model would produce results qualitatively similar to the ones we 
derive here. From the quantitative point of view, the impact of raising the share of 
productive public spending would be magnified. We therefore believe that 
excluding private capital does not – in our model – fundamentally alter the 
implications of shifting public spending towards the kind of large infrastructure 
projects that we have in mind in motivating this paper. 
 
 
Profits 
 
Domestic firms minimize their costs wtlt(z) subject to (2.16). The nominal 
marginal cost is given by 
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α
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The profits of domestic firms are given by 
 
)z(lw)z(y)z(p)z( ttttt −=π  (2.19) 
 
Equations (2.19) and (2.12) can be substituted into the households’ budget 
constraint equation (2.4) to derive the consolidated budget constraint of the 
domestic economy 
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Making use of the global asset-market-clearing condition 0D)n1(nD *tt =−+ , the 
consolidated budget constraint of the foreign economy can be derived in an 
analogous way as 
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The fact that the law of one price holds in each country and domestic and foreign 
households consume identical consumption baskets implies the following demand 
curve for each differentiated good z 
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where WtC  is world private consumption demand, given by 
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and world total government spending WtC  is defined in an analogous way. 
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Price setting 
 
In the absence of nominal rigidities, each home firm would maximize its profits 
using p(z) as the choice variable. This would imply  
 
)z(MC
1
)z(p tt
−θ
θ
=  (2.24) 
 
Following Calvo (1983), we introduce nominal rigidities by assuming that each 
firm resets its prices with a probability γ−1  in each period, independently of 
other firms and independently of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Each 
firm has to take into account, when setting its profit-maximizing price, that in 
every subsequent period there is a probability 0 < γ < 1 that it will not be able to 
revise its price setting decision. When setting a new price in period t, each firm 
seeks to maximize the present value of profits weighting future profits by the 
probability that the price will still be effective in that period. Thus the 
representative home firm seeks to maximize 
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where ζt,s is the domestic discount factor between period t and period s, defined as 
1
j
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+Π=ζ  where i denotes the nominal interest rate. The result is that the 
pricing rule for home good z is given by 
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All firms in a country are symmetric and every firm that changes its price in any 
given period chooses the same price and output consistently with (2.26). The 
structure of price setting implies that each period a fraction of γ−1  of firms sets a 
new price and the remaining fraction keeps their price unchanged. 
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2.4 The initial steady state 
The model is log-linearized around a symmetric steady state where all exogenous 
variables are constant. In addition, initial net foreign assets and government 
capital spending are both zero. 
 In existing NOEM models total government spending is usually assumed to 
be zero at the initial steady state. We depart from this practice by assuming that 
government consumption is positive and equal in both countries at the initial 
steady state. This allows us to carry out policy exercises in which a reduction in 
public consumption is used to finance an increase in public capital. We also 
assume that the initial level of private consumption is equal in both countries. 
 Our assumptions imply that the optimal labor supply (2.8), the pricing rule 
(2.24), the production function (2.16)5 and their foreign equivalent equations can 
be combined to yield the following relationships between steady-state output, 
labor supply, and consumption 
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1ly  (2.28) 
 
where 0 subscripts denote the initial steady state.6 
 
 
3 Parameterization 
We simulate our model for a benchmark parameterization and we check the 
sensitivity of our results by also considering alternative values for the productivity 
of public capital and the weight of public consumption in private utility. 
 In the benchmark parameterization, the elasticity of substitution between 
differentiated goods θ is set equal to 6, implying a 20 per cent mark-up of prices 
over marginal costs in the steady state. The subjective discount factor β is set at 
1/1.05, which implies a 5 per cent annual real interest rate. The price stickiness 
parameter γ is assumed to be equal to 0.5, implying an average delay between 
                                                 
5 Assume that the production function in the initial steady state is yt(z) = lt(z). 
6 The derivation of equations (2.27)–(2.28) and (4.1)–(4.2) is also based on the fact that initial 
output is equal to the sum of initial private and public consumption in each country. This is a 
consequence of the assumption of zero initial net foreign assets holdings. 
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price adjustments of two years.7 As it can be seen by looking at equation (2.10) 
and its foreign equivalent, the parameter ε determines both the consumption and 
interest elasticity of money demand. We set ε equal to 9, which implies a 
consumption elasticity of money demand of 1/9 and an interest rate elasticity of 
money demand of –1/9.8 The two countries are assumed to be of equal size, ie 
n = 0.5. The ratio of initial total government spending (ie initial public 
consumption to output) is set to 0.2. 
 In the benchmark simulations presented below, we assume that the utility 
provided by public consumption is low compared to that provided by private 
consumption. We therefore set φ = 0.4. We also need to specify values for the 
productivity and depreciation rate of public capital parameters, α and λ. The latter 
is assumed to be 0.10 (as in Baxter and King, 1993, and Rioja, 2003). The existing 
literature is far from conclusive on what a plausible value for α could be. Glomm 
and Ravikumar (1997) surveys paper which have attempted to estimate the 
productivity of public capital. Results vary from a statistically insignificant α 
(Hulten and Schwab, 1991) to 0.39 (Aschauer, 1989). Although Aschauer’s upper 
bound is widely cited, most studies criticize it as too high and find estimates 
which are positive but much smaller. We therefore consider two values of α in our 
experiments, α = 0.05 (as in Baxter and King, 1993) and α = 0.1 (as in Rioja, 
2003). 
 In what follows we consider the domestic and international impact of both 
permanent and temporary shocks to government spending composition in the 
domestic country. In the case of permanent shocks the persistency parameter ρ is 
set to 1 in equations (2.14) and (2.15). In the case of temporary shocks, we set this 
parameter to 0.8. We simulate the model using the algorithm developed by Klein 
(2000) and McCallum (2001). 
 
 
4 A permanent shift in government spending 
composition 
In this section we consider a permanent one percentage increase in home 
government infrastructure investment relative to initial output and a simultaneous 
one percentage decrease in home government consumption relative to initial 
output. Total government spending is therefore constant both at home and in the 
foreign country. The composition of foreign public spending is unchanged 
compared to the initial steady state. We evaluate the impact of such a policy on 
                                                 
7 Carlton (1986) suggests that that in various industries is not unusual for prices to remain 
unchanged for several years. 
8 Our parameterization is mostly consistent with Sutherland (1996). 
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the main domestic and foreign macroeconomic variables as well as on domestic 
and foreign welfare. 
 The results for this case are presented in Figure 4.1. The vertical axes show 
percentage deviations from the initial steady state. For variables whose initial 
steady state value is zero, the percentage deviations are expressed in relation to 
initial output. 
 
 
4.1 The impact on the domestic economy 
Figure 4.1 shows that a shift in the composition of public spending towards public 
capital generates a boom in the domestic economy, by increasing domestic output. 
This is consistent with the findings of other papers which have investigated the 
impact of an increase in public capital in closed economies (for example, Baxter 
and King, 1993). The basic intuition for this result is that an increase in public 
capital leads to an expansion of production possibilities, thus implying an increase 
in domestic output. 
 Since the accumulation of public capital is gradual, the increase in domestic 
output is equally gradual, with an almost insignificant impact in the short run. 
However, since domestic households anticipate the medium and long-run increase 
in output, they increase private consumption immediately in order to smooth 
consumption intertemporally. This implies that the domestic economy must run a 
current account deficit in the short run to be able to consume more than it is 
producing in anticipation of future productivity gains. Consequently, in order to 
service the accumulated external debt domestic output has to increase more than 
consumption in the long run. 
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Figure 4.1 The effects of a permanent shift in government 
   spending composition 
 
 
 
 
A prima facie interpretation of these results could lead to the conclusion that a 
domestic shift in the composition of public spending towards public infrastructure 
worsens the sustainability of the domestic economy by increasing its external 
debt. However, if we take the view that public capital increases a country’s net 
worth (see, for example, Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama, 2006), then the 
accumulation of external debt does not necessarily imply a worsening of total 
domestic net worth, since it is more than offset by the permanent increase in 
public capital. 
 Figure 4.1 also highlights the role of α. A higher α increases the productivity 
of public capital more, thus implying a further expansion of production 
possibilities, which results in higher domestic output. An increase in α also 
increases the domestic marginal productivity of labor; this allows domestic firms 
to produce more output for a given labor input. Equations (2.18) and (2.24) imply 
that an increase in α would reduce prices if these were perfectly flexible. 
However, due to the presence of nominal rigidities, prices cannot be reduced to 
fully match the increase in productivity. The fact that output increases while 
prices are only partially adjusted results in higher domestic profits in the short run. 
Since domestic firms are owned by domestic households, higher profits are re-
distributed to them, partly translating into higher consumption for a higher level 
of α. 
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 Figure 4.1(h) also shows that a shift in the composition of spending has a non-
monotonic impact on home employment, since it tends to reduce it in the short 
run, but raise it in the medium and long run. In addition, an increase in α has a 
similar non-monotonic impact. This can be seen by comparing the results for 
α = 0.05 and α = 0.1 in Figure 4.1(h). A higher α generates lower domestic 
employment in the short-run (the first ten periods after the shock) but higher 
domestic employment afterwards. 
 The results described above reflect various effects at work following an 
increase in the level and productivity of public capital. One obvious implication of 
higher and/or more productive public capital is that the same level of output can 
be produced with less labor effort. This ‘pure public capital productivity’ effect 
explains why domestic employment initially falls when the level of public capital 
is increased, and why it falls more if the productivity of public capital is higher. 
 However, higher and more productive public capital also implies that, on 
average, the prices of domestic goods are lower. This raises the real wage, thus 
generating incentives for higher domestic labor supply. In addition to this increase 
in the real wage, the domestic accumulation of current account deficit reduces 
domestic households’ net wealth, thus pushing them to increase their labor supply 
(ie to decrease their consumption of leisure). In the medium and long run, the 
wealth effect stemming from the current account deficit, together with the impact 
of the higher real wage, more than offset the pure public capital productivity 
effect. The interaction of these various effects thus explains the non-monotonic 
impact of both a shift towards public capital and of a higher α on domestic labor 
supply. Intuitively, these results imply that the short-run impact of productive 
capital in the economy might result in a job-less expansion, due to the generalized 
increase in productivity, while in the medium and long run the benefits of 
expanding the production possibilities of the economy will manifest themselves 
not only on economic activity but also on employment. 
 
 
4.2 The open economy impact 
As we stressed in the Introduction, one advantage of the open economy set-up is 
that it enables us to assess the impact of shifts in public spending composition on 
the exchange rate and on foreign variables. 
 Figure 4.1(e) shows that an increase in productive capital in the domestic 
economy implies an appreciation of the domestic exchange rate (a fall of the price 
of the foreign currency expressed in terms of the domestic currency). The main 
mechanism at work is a ‘money demand’ effect arising through higher domestic 
consumption: as discussed in Section 4.1, domestic consumption increases, both 
in absolute terms and relative to foreign one, when the domestic government 
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shifts its spending composition towards productive capital. Since money demand 
is a positive function of consumption (see equations (2.10) and (2.11)), an 
increase in domestic consumption relative to foreign one increases domestic 
money demand compared to foreign one. An appreciation of the domestic 
currency is therefore required to reestablish equilibrium in the money market. The 
fact that domestic consumption increases more when α is higher implies that the 
money demand effect is stronger in that case. This explains why the domestic 
currency appreciates even more when public capital is more productive. 
 Figure 4.1(c) also shows that foreign output increases in the short run and 
slightly declines in the long run following a shift in domestic public spending 
composition, while foreign private consumption displays an opposite response. 
The short-run increase in foreign output can be explained by both an ‘expenditure 
switching’ and an ‘expenditure boosting’ effect. The expenditure switching effect 
is due to the fact that an appreciation of the domestic currency makes foreign 
goods cheaper. This shifts some of the higher world demand away from domestic 
and towards foreign goods. However, since the effect on the exchange rate is 
small in our model, so is the expenditure switching effect. 
 What accounts for the bulk of the short-run increase in foreign output is 
therefore the expenditure boosting effect, due to higher aggregate demand in the 
world economy in the wake of an increase in production possibilities in the 
domestic economy. As we have seen, an immediate implication of the latter is a 
consumption boom in the domestic economy. Since household preferences do not 
display home bias, part of the higher domestic demand falls on foreign goods, 
thus explaining why foreign output increases on impact. 
 Since the stock of foreign public capital has not changed, foreign households 
have to meet the increased demand for their goods with the same pre-shock 
technology, ie the foreign equivalent of equation (2.16) with an unchanged level 
of public capital. This implies that foreign labor supply will need to increase. As 
the (foreign equivalent of) utility function (1) shows, the marginal disutility of 
supplying labor increases for higher levels of labor supply, while the marginal 
utility of private consumption is higher for lower consumption levels. This means 
that lower levels of private consumption (ie higher levels of marginal utility of 
consumption) need to correspond to higher levels of labor supply (ie to higher 
levels of marginal disutility of supplying labor). In this way, foreign agents seek 
to compensate the higher marginal disutility of providing an additional amount of 
labor with the marginal utility of the amount of private consumption that the 
increase in labor supply can buy. 
 In the long run, however, the accumulation of external assets by foreign 
households – the other side of the coin of the current account deficit run by the 
domestic country – implies an increase in both private consumption and leisure of 
foreign residents. In addition, a ‘terms-of-trade’ effect is at work in the long run. 
A rise in supply of domestic goods worsens the domestic terms of trade (ie the 
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price of domestic goods relative to foreign falls). This implies that foreign 
consumption is higher in the long run. Both the accumulation of external assets 
and the worsening in the domestic terms of trade have a positive effect on long-
run foreign private consumption. 
 
 
4.3 Welfare impact 
In this section we focus on the welfare impact of a shift in the domestic 
composition of government spending. As we stressed in the Introduction, the 
trade-off between utility-enhancing public consumption and productivity-
enhancing public capital is often a crucial aspect of the public debate and of 
policy discussions. In spite of this, we are not aware of any paper which explicitly 
focuses on this trade-off in the NOEM framework. The basic intuition behind this 
trade-off is that cutting spending for public consumption directly reduces 
households utility. However, if the cut in current spending is used to raise public 
capital, this shift can also have a positive indirect effect on households utility, 
namely through the impact of improved public infrastructure on other variables 
which affect private utility. 
 In our welfare analysis it is useful to look at a measure of accumulated 
welfare over the long-term planning horizon of the representative agent. In ‘first 
generation’ NOEM models such as the seminal Redux model (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 1995) prices are fixed for one period and economies reach the steady state 
in the following period. In such a framework, the welfare effect of a shock is the 
sum of the short-run change in utility and the discounted present value of the 
change in steady-state utility. Since we have staggered price setting, we calculate 
the present discounted value (PDV) of the change in utility, using a large number 
of periods to numerically approximate the long-term impact. 
 Formally, the change in domestic utility in period t is given by 
 
C
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while an analogous expression holds for foreign utility.9 The PDV value of the 
change in utility is therefore calculated as 
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with an equivalent expression holding for the foreign country. 
                                                 
9 As customary in this literature, we neglect the utility derived from real balances. 
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 Figure 4.1(i) illustrates the response of domestic instantaneous utility (dUt) to 
changes in government spending composition for various combinations of the 
productivity of public capital (α) and the weight of public consumption in private 
utility (φ). Figure 4.1(i) shows that a shift in composition toward public capital is 
more likely to be welfare enhancing in every period for domestic households the 
higher is α and the lower φ. The intuition behind these results is straightforward. 
Since a decrease in public consumption directly lowers welfare, the direct utility 
loss of a shift in the composition of spending is lower if households attach a low 
weight to public consumption in their utility function. In addition, the loss due to 
lower public consumption can be compensated by the fact that higher public 
infrastructure allow households to consume more privately at every horizon. 
Furthermore, this effect is stronger for higher values of α (Figure 4.1(b)). This 
effect is reinforced also because higher consumption can be achieved domestically 
without having to increase labor proportionally to the increase in consumption. On 
the contrary, labor effort can even be reduced in the short term (Figure 4.1(h)). 
 The welfare results presented in Figure 4.1(i) can be compared with those of 
previous papers. Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) look separately at public 
consumption and public investment expansions, rather than at a shift in 
composition for a given level of total government spending. They stress how in 
their model a permanent expansion in public investment requires agents to 
sacrifice more welfare initially (compared to a permanent expansion in public 
consumption) in exchange for increased steady-state welfare.10 This implies that, 
in their model, an exercise like the one we consider would unambiguously reduce 
welfare on impact. This is due to the fact that an increase in public investment 
generates a higher level of transitional investment compared to an increase in 
public consumption. In Turnovsky and Fisher’s neoclassical framework this can 
only be achieved by temporary reducing the level of private consumption, thus 
short-run utility. 
 In our model, this trade-off between short term welfare losses and long-run 
welfare gains of a shift toward higher public investment can be eliminated for 
reasonable parameter values (when the weight of public consumption in private 
utility is not too high). This is a result of two fundamental differences between our 
modeling framework and the one used by Turnovsky and Fisher (1995). First, due 
to the to the presence of imperfect competition, the initial output and consumption 
steady state is sub-optimally low in our model. As a consequence, unlike in 
Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), in our framework the expansion of public capital 
need not happen at the expense of short-run resources available to the private 
sector. Second, the open economy dimension also implies that, in our model, 
domestic households can increase short-run consumption, and therefore welfare, 
by running a current account deficit. This effect is absent by definition in 
                                                 
10 See Turnovsky and Fisher (1995, p. 769). 
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Turnovsky and Fisher (1995): due to the closed-economy setting, in their 
framework domestic agents are not able to increase consumption in the short run 
by accumulating external debt. 
 The discussion above implies that, from the point of view of the short-run 
welfare effects, our new Keynesian framework is closer to the endogenous growth 
model presented by Barro (1990) than to Turnovsky and Fisher (1995). In Barro 
(1990) an increase in the share of productive government spending over total 
spending unambiguously raises the rate of growth of output and private savings at 
all horizons, with a positive impact on utility. 
 
Table 4.1 PDV of change in utility in the case of a permanent 
   shift in government spending composition 
 
Parameterization dUDPV *DPVdU  
α = 0.05; φ = 0.2 3.7 0.65 
α = 0.05; φ = 0.4 –0.45 0.65 
α = 0.10; φ = 0.4 7.5 1.2 
 
 
So far, the discussion has focused on short-run utility. Table 4.1 shows the PDV 
of welfare for the same parameterizations considered in Figure 4.1.11 Overall, the 
results presented in Table 4.1 suggest that a shift toward public infrastructure is 
welfare enhancing domestically if the weight of public consumption (compared to 
private consumption) in private utility is low and/or the productivity of public 
capital is high. However, since a negative welfare impact cannot be ruled out 
when the weight of public consumption in private utility is relatively high (see the 
case α = 0.05 and φ = 0.4) the results also imply that governments should take into 
account households’ preferences with respect to public provision of services in 
order to evaluate shifts in the composition of public spending. Similarly, given the 
importance of changes in α for the welfare results, the impact of planned 
infrastructure projects on the productivity of the private sector should be 
evaluated as carefully as possible before changing the public spending mix. 
 Figure 4.1(j) presents the impact on foreign utility of a domestic shift in 
public spending composition. The international consequence of the shift in public 
spending decided by the home country is a reduction of foreign instantaneous 
utility in the short run. This negative international welfare spillover is reversed in 
the medium and long run, due to the changes in the paths of foreign private 
consumption and employment discussed in section 4.2. Table 4.1 illustrates that 
the overall effect on the PDV of foreign utility is positive because the positive 
                                                 
11 For instance, if α = 0.05 and φ = 0.2, a permanent shift in government spending increases the 
PDV of domestic utility by 3.7 per cent and the PDV of foreign utility by 0.65 per cent. The 
numerical values presented in Tables 4.1 and 5.1 are calculated using 200 periods. 
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medium and long run effects of the domestic policy shift more than offset the 
negative short-run impact. The main intuitive explanation for the increase in 
overall foreign welfare is related to the terms of trade effect: an increase in the 
supply of domestic goods induces an improvement in the terms of trade of the 
foreign country, resulting in a higher level of foreign consumption. 
 Figure 4.1(j) also shows that the negative short-run impact on foreign utility is 
stronger for higher values of α. This has interesting implications for international 
policy coordination. In the short run, the more efficient is the reallocation of 
public spending decided by the domestic authorities (the higher α), the more the 
domestic policy change harms foreign residents. The intuitive explanation for this 
result is that having more efficient infrastructure generates a competitive 
advantage for the domestic economy compared to the foreign. The domestic 
expansion of productive possibilities also generates some positive international 
demand spillovers which partially benefit foreign residents. However, foreign 
residents have to meet the increased global demand within a relatively 
underdeveloped (compared to domestic) public infrastructure system. Figure 
4.1(j) shows that the positive spillover impact of the domestic policy shift does 
not offset the domestic competitive advantage quickly enough to prevent foreign 
welfare from falling in the short run. 
 One implication of this analysis is that the domestic policy change and the 
associate short run welfare loss of the foreign country can generate incentives for 
reallocation of public spending also in the foreign country. Although the impact 
on the PDV of foreign utility is positive for reasonable parameter values (Table 
4.1), if foreign authorities are worried about welfare dynamics (not only about the 
PDV of utility) they will still try to offset the negative short run effect of the 
domestic policy. In order to do so, they will have an incentive to also increase the 
level of foreign productive public capital in response to the domestic policy. In 
such circumstances, a domestic policy shift can therefore trigger a virtuous global 
technological cycle. 
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5 A temporary shift in government spending 
composition 
In this section we assess the impact of a temporary shift in domestic government 
spending composition. In this policy experiment the persistency parameter ρ is set 
to 0.8 in equations (2.14) and (2.15). Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 illustrate the results 
in this case.12 
 
Table 5.1 PDV of change in utility in the case of a temporary 
   shift in government spending composition 
 
Parameterization dUDPV *DPVdU  
α = 0.05; φ = 0.4 –0.089 0.13 
α = 0.10; φ = 0.4 1.5 0.27 
 
 
As Figure 5.1(g) shows, depreciation of public capital implies that the stock of 
public infrastructure accumulated while public investment was temporarily higher 
is almost completely depleted about 40 periods after the shock. This dynamics 
implies that the increase in productivity of domestic firms is also only temporary. 
The temporary increase in productivity brings about a temporary rise in domestic 
output, which is, for obvious reasons, more pronounced for higher values of α 
(Figure 5.1(a)). Domestic households also temporarily increase consumption 
following the temporary increase in productivity (Figure 5.1(b)). For consumption 
smoothing reasons analogous to those discussed in section 4.1, domestic 
households save part of the temporary higher income by running a current account 
surplus in the medium run. Figure 5.1(f) shows that domestic residents 
accumulate a permanently higher amount of bonds. One of the implications of a 
temporary increase in the stock of public infrastructure is therefore a permanent 
improvement in the net worth position of the domestic economy. Due to higher 
interest income, domestic private consumption is higher in the new steady state. 
 The short-run response of foreign output and consumption is similar to the 
one displayed in the case of permanent shifts in government spending 
composition, and can be explained with arguments analogous to the ones 
discussed in section 4.2. However, since the total expenditure boosting effect 
stemming from an increase in domestic productivity is smaller over the time 
horizon considered, the reaction of foreign variables is also quantitatively more 
limited in the case of temporary shifts. 
                                                 
12 Figures 5.1 shows that, although the solution of the model is stable, it takes more than 40 
periods to reach the new steady state. 
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 The accumulation of a current account deficit implies that foreign residents 
reduce both their private consumption and their leisure (increase output) in the 
long run, due to reduced wealth. However, they intertemporally smooth this 
behavior, thus temporarily increasing their leisure and consumption in the 
medium term (Figure 5.1(c,d)). In addition, the more pronounced medium-run fall 
in foreign output in the case of a higher α also reflects some market gains of 
domestic firms at the expense of foreign firms, since the nominal appreciation of 
the domestic currency (Figure 5.1(e)) is more than offset by the fact that domestic 
prices are likely to fall more than foreign prices in the medium run when α is 
higher. This in turn is because a higher level of α reduces domestic (but not 
foreign) marginal costs and therefore domestic (but not foreign) prices. 
 
Figure 5.1 The effects of a temporary shift in government 
   spending composition 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1(i) shows that, contrary to the case of a permanent shift, a temporary 
domestic policy shift can reduce domestic welfare in the short run even when α is 
high (ie α = 0.1). This can intuitively be explained by the fact that the expansion 
of production possibilities is much more limited when the shift is only temporary. 
Domestic households therefore cannot expand private consumption as much as in 
the permanent case. The impact of the reduction of public consumption hence 
dominates domestic utility in the short run. In the long run, CtG  returns to the 
initial level, thus neutralizing the negative welfare impact of the temporary 
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reduction in public consumption. However, domestic welfare increases in the long 
run (rather than just returning to the pre-shock level) because the higher wealth 
accumulated by domestic residents through running a current account surplus 
allows them to reduce their supply of labor while at the same time increasing 
private consumption. Table 5.1 shows that the PDV of domestic welfare is 
positive for a high level of α (α = 0.10). In this case, the long run improvement in 
utility more that offsets the short run reduction in terms of PDV. On the other 
hand, if α is low (α = 0.05), the PDV of domestic utility is negative. 
 In terms of foreign welfare, Figure 5.1(j) shows that the impact on utility is 
driven by foreign consumption and output movements, and is negative in the short 
and the long run but briefly positive in the medium run. The short-term welfare 
loss of foreign agents is more limited compared to domestic residents, because 
foreigners do not see their utility reduced by a cut in publicly provided 
consumption. This is implies that, as shown in Table 5.1, the PDV of foreign 
utility is positive both for high and for low values of α. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we focused, in the context of an open-economy model with imperfect 
competition and nominal rigidities, on the trade-offs faced by governments in 
deciding the allocation of public spending between productivity-enhancing public 
infrastructures and utility-enhancing public consumption. 
 Our analysis shows that shifts in the composition of public spending have 
important positive and welfare implications, both domestically and abroad. In 
particular, a temporary increase in the domestic stock of public capital financed 
by a reduction in public consumption reduces domestic welfare if the productivity 
of public capital is low. If the policy shift is permanent, domestic utility is 
increased if the productivity of government spending is not too low and the 
importance of public consumption (relative to private consumption) in private 
utility is not too high. However, since a negative welfare impact cannot be ruled 
out when the weight of public consumption in private utility is relatively high, one 
policy implication of our results is that governments should take into account 
households’ preferences with respect to public provision of services in order to 
evaluate shifts in the composition of public spending. Similarly, given the 
importance of changes in α for the welfare results, the impact of planned 
infrastructure projects on the productivity of the private sector should be 
evaluated as carefully as possible before changing the public spending mix. These 
concerns are valid in the cases of permanent as well as temporary shifts in the 
composition of public spending, since in both cases the PDV of domestic welfare 
can be negative for reasonable parameterizations. 
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 With regards to the effect on foreign welfare, a domestic shift in government 
spending implies a reduction of short-tem foreign utility, while the PDV of 
foreign welfare is positive, as the benefits of the global expansion in demand are 
reaped in the medium-long run by the foreign country. If foreign authorities are 
worried not only about the PDV of utility, but also about welfare dynamics, they 
will still try to offset the negative short-run welfare effect of the domestic policy. 
In this case, they will have an incentive to increase the level of foreign productive 
public capital. In such a situation a domestic policy shift can therefore trigger a 
virtuous global technological cycle. 
 Some of our results might obviously be sensitive to the specification of our 
model. In particular, we assume that public and private consumption enter private 
utility in a non-separable way. This means that the decrease in utility-enhancing 
public consumption necessary to finance the increase in productive public 
infrastructure does not affect the marginal utility of private consumption. Non-
separability between private and public consumption could of course be an 
interesting case to consider in future research. How our results would be affected 
by the introduction of non-separability would depend on whether public and 
private consumption are substitute or complements. Another interesting extension 
of the model would be the introduction of asymmetry between the domestic and 
foreign countries. This could be achieved, for example, by introducing home bias 
in private and public consumption. 
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